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Abstract
An oversight in Guaspari and Solovay’s “Rosser sentences” [D. Guaspari, R.M. Solovay, Rosser sentences, Annals of
Mathematical Logic 16 (1) (1979) 81–99] is pointed out and emended. It concerns the premisses of their proof that there are
standard proof predicates all of whose Rosser sentences are provably equivalent. The result holds up, but the premisses mentioned
in the paper have to be strengthened somewhat.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In 1979 David Guaspari and Robert Solovay published a joint paper titled “Rosser sentences” [1].1 In this paper,
they introduce formal systems of propositional modal logic which capture the provability logic of Rosser sentences,
i.e., of sentences in the language LPA of Peano arithmetic which assert: “there is a disproof of me that occurs before
any proof of me.”
For these formal systems semantical and arithmetical completeness theorems hold, which are formulated and
proved by Guaspari and Solovay in Sections 3–5 of their paper. They then go on to apply their results in Parts A and B
of Section 6. Thus, in Subsection 6.A they show that there are standard proof predicates2 not all of whose Rosser
sentences are provably equivalent. Finally, in Subsection 6.C, they prove that there also are standard proof predicates
(SPP’s) all of whose Rosser sentences are provably equivalent.
To this purpose, they define an exotic proof predicate which utilizes a list of its own Rosser sentences, the ‘Rosser
list’, in deciding how to behave. For this reason I call the new proof predicate “LTh” — short for “(Rosser) list
theorem”. The formula LTh(f) will be of the form ∃lLPF(l, f), where “LPF(l, f)” stands for “l is a ‘list proof’
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1 The present paper should be read along with [1] to supply the context not given here.
2 The concept of a standard proof predicate is a generalization of Go¨del’s Bew(f), which says: “there is a PA-proof the last line of which is f”;
see Definition 1.
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for f”.3 The formula LPF(l, f) is a pterm (pseudo-term) with respect to f [2, p. 24], i.e., PA proves that for every l,
there is one and only one f such that LPF(l, f). (The pterm LPF(l, f) corresponds to the recursive function f in [1,
pp. 97–98].)
In defining LPF(l, f), Guaspari and Solovay start with an arbitrary SPP Th(f) having a certain additional
property (+), given in [1, p. 97]. For example, Th(f) might be the usual proof predicate Bew(f). From Th(f) we
obtain a formula ThNum(m, f)which describes a numeration of the PA-theorems w.r. t. Th(f). (In the case of Bew(f)
this could be a numeration replicating the sequence given by the size of the Go¨del numbers of corresponding proofs.)
Since ThNum(m, f) is a pterm, we can adopt a convention from [2, p. 24] and write “thNum(m)” to stand for the f
with ThNum(m, f), as if “thNum” were a new one-place function letter. (This pterm corresponds to the recursive
function g in [1, pp. 97–98].)
The new proof predicate LTh(f) works according to the following algorithm4: In the beginning we let LTh output
whatever thNum outputs; that is, we let LPF
(
0, thNum(0)
)
, LPF
(
1, thNum(1)
)
, and so forth. While this is going on
we also check each formula that is output whether it is by any chance one which says, for some sentence ρ:
ρ is a Rosser sentence with respect to LTh(f),
i.e., whether it is of the form,
ρ ↔ ∃y
[
LPF
(
y, p¬ρq) ∧ (∀z≤y) ¬LPF(z, pρq)].
If so, we add ρ to the Rosser list — or at least we do so ordinarily. However, we don’t want the list to contain sentences
ρ1, ρ2 for which ρ2 = ¬ρ1, because then we would have to keep track of which of them comes earlier in the list. In
order to avoid this, we refrain from adding the Rosser sentence ρ to the Rosser list if the list already includes either¬ρ
or some ρ′ such that ρ = ¬ρ′.
While LTh outputs Th-theorems and, slowly, the Rosser list is being built up, we also watch whether one of these
Th-theorems is (i) a Rosser sentence w.r. t. LTh(f), or (ii) the negation of one. (Actually, we merely look whether it
is one of the sentences on the Rosser list in its current state, or the negation of such a sentence.) When this happens,
Guaspari and Solovay say: ‘the bell rings.’
In case (i), Th outputs an LTh-Rosser sentence. We let LTh reproduce this behavior by making LTh immediately
output the whole Rosser list and, afterwards, all sentences of LPA in some arbitrary order.5 Assuming that LTh hasn’t
yet output the negation of any of the sentences on the list, all list members are thus output (‘proved’) by LTh
before their negations are. But as Rosser sentences they all assert the converse. Thus they are all false, and therefore
equivalent.
In case (ii), i.e., if Th outputs the negation of a Rosser sentence, we make LTh immediately output the negations
of all the sentences on the list and then (as before) all sentences of LPA. Assuming that LTh hasn’t yet output any of
the Rosser-listed sentences themselves, their negations are thus being ‘proved’ before they themselves are. This is just
what they say, and so they are all true and hence equivalent.
This sketch is of course far from sufficient as a proof that all Rosser sentences w.r. t. LTh(f) are provably equivalent;
it is merely intended to provide some conception of the functioning of the new proof predicate LTh(f), and to hint at
the direction which a proof would have to take. Here, it is enough to say that a proof is given in [1, pp. 97–98], but that
the condition (+) offered in the paper is slightly too weak to support the proof presented for the central Lemma 6.3
[1, p. 98].6 The point of this paper is to emend the condition and to show — in a little more detail than in the original
paper — how Lemma 6.3 is to be proved.
2. How to prove Lemma 6.3
Here is Guaspari and Solovay’s definition of a standard proof predicate [1, p. 83]:
3 I employ typewriter font to set off object-language variables.
4 Cf. [3, [24.1], [24.2]]. The proof predicate is obtained via the diagonal lemma from a formalization of the following description.
5 Guaspari and Solovay let LTh also output the negations of the list members after outputting the members themselves, but that isn’t necessary.
An analogous point holds for case (ii), where Th outputs a negated Rosser sentence.
6 I do not however have a proof for this claim. The same result as in [1] is given in Smoryn´ski’s [4, Lemma 3.7, p. 295] for the usual proof
predicate, but he doesn’t have a similar problem because his definition of “standard proof predicate” [4, p. 279] already includes provable
equivalence to Bew(f), and thus our properties (+∗) and (+′) (see p. 66).
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Definition 1. Th(f) is a standard proof predicate (SPP) iff Th(f) is a Σ 01 -numeration of the theorems of PA in PA—
i.e., there is a ∆01-formula PF(p, f) such that Th(f) = ∃p PF(p, f) and for all LPA-sentences ϕ,
(SPP1) N  Th
(pϕq) ⇔ PA ` ϕ
holds — satisfying, for all sentences ϕ and ψ :
(SPP2) PA ` Th(pϕ→ψq) ∧ Th(pϕq) → Th(pψq),
and for every Σ 01 -sentence σ :
(SPP3) PA ` σ → Th(pσq).
Every SPP Th(f) fulfills the Bernays–Lo¨b derivability conditions, including, for all sentences ϕ:
(DC1) PA ` ϕ ⇒ PA ` Th(pϕq).7
The extra property (+) for SPP’s Th(f), as given in [1, p. 97], is the following:
(+) PA proves: “{f ∣∣Th(f)} is closed under tautological consequence and contains all true Σ 01 -sentences”,
where “true” is formalized by using the ‘usual’ truth predicate for Σ 01 -formulas.
To make this more explicit, let Taut(f) be a ∆01-formula expressing that f is (the Go¨del number of) a tautological
LPA-sentence, and let ΣTrue(f) be Σ 01 , saying: “f is a true Σ 01 -sentence”, where a sentence’s being true is analyzed
as its being satisfied by some variable assignment.8 Furthermore, let Cond(f, g, c) be a ∆01-pterm w.r. t. c which
characterizes c as the material conditional of the formulas f and g. For this cwe subsequently write, not “cond(f, g)”,
but, more suggestively, “f©→g”. Then (+) consists in
(+1) PA ` ∀f
[
Taut(f)→ Th(f)],
(+2) PA ` ∀f, g
[
Th(f©→g) ∧ Th(f)→ Th(g)
]
,
(+3) PA ` ∀f
[
ΣTrue(f)→ Th(f)].
Guaspari and Solovay’s proof of Lemma 6.3, however, needs an SPP Th(f) with a little more than (+). This having
been brought to his attention, Bob Solovay suggested strengthening (+) so as to include provable closure of Th under
first-order logical consequence. The modified property (+∗) then has (+2) and (+3) as before and, in place of (+1),
the following:
(+′1) PA ` ∀f
[
PLTh(f)→ Th(f)],
where PLTh(f) is Σ 01 , saying that there is an LPA-proof for sentence f in first-order predicate logic, that is, a proof in
the language of Peano arithmetic not using any arithmetical axioms.9
As an anonymous referee has remarked, what we actually make use of in proving Lemma 6.3, besides
(+2) and (+3), is merely a weak consequence of (+′1). — To enhance readability, I introduce some further pterms
and other notation: CTm(t) is to be a ∆01-formula saying that t is a constant term; “num(x)” is used to denote (the
Go¨del number of) the numeral of the number x, a constant term; “subst(f, v, t)” refers to the result of substituting
the term t for the variable v in the formula f; and “subst2(f; v, v′; t, t′)” is short for
subst
(
subst(f, v, t), v′, t′
)
.
Finally, “f©↔g” and “©¬ f” are to stand for the biconditional of the formulas f and g and the negation of f, respectively,
defined in analogy to “f©→g”. All of these pterms are ∆01. — Now, as condition (+′) we require that over and above
(+1)–(+3), the following holds:
7 This is because PA is Σ -complete and thus N  Th
(pϕq) implies PA ` Th(pϕq); cf. [5, Section 8.2].
8 Cf. [6, Ch. 9] or [3, Sect. 23].
9 Conditions (+′1), (+2) and (DC1) together imply (+3).
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(+4) for all formulas ϕ and all variables x, x′,
PA ` ∀t, t′
[
CTm(t) ∧ CTm(t′) ∧ Th(p∀x, x′ ϕq) → Th(subst2(pϕq; pxq, px′q; t, t′))].10
We prove the central lemma (cf. [3, [27.8]]) using the property (+′). For good measure, we also sketch a proof
based on (+1)–(+3) and (+′4) (see fn. 10), which is more similar to the original proof in [1].
Lemma 1. PA proves: “if the bell rings,
{
f
∣∣Th(f)} is inconsistent, i.e., Th(p⊥q) holds”.
Proof. Reason in PA. Suppose, e.g., that the bell rings in step m because thNum(m) itself is already on the Rosser list.
Let’s call it “r” for “Rosser sentence”. That r is on the list must be because thNum has previously output (the Go¨del
number of) a sentence of the form
ρ ↔ ∃y
[
LPF
(
y, p¬ρq) ∧ (∀z≤y) ¬LPF(z, pρq)],
viz., a sentence saying: “r is a Rosser sentence w.r. t. LTh(f).” I call such a biconditional’s right-hand side the
“Rosser proposition for ρ”. Its construction can be captured in a ∆01-formula RProp(f, p), a pterm w.r. t. p, and I
write “rProp(f)” for such a p. So, thNum has output r©↔ rProp(r). Thus we have Th(r©↔ rProp(r)) and, since
r is thNum(m), also Th(r). These two facts yield Th
(
rProp(r)
)
: by (+1) we have
Th
([
r©↔ rProp(r)] ©→ [r©→ rProp(r)]),
and two applications of (+2) give usTh
(
rProp(r)
)
. Abbreviating the cumbersome formula ∃y [LPF(y, f)∧(∀z≤ y)
¬LPF(z, g)] as “Before(f, g)”,11 and letting n := ©¬ r, we can denote rProp(r) somewhat more transparently as
“pBefore(n˙, r˙)q”.12 So, we have
Th
(pBefore(n˙, r˙)q), (1)
which means that Th says: “there is an LTh-disproof of r which occurs before any LTh-proof of r.”
But it’s just the other way round in fact: The bell rang because thNum(m) (= r) is on the Rosser list, so, by
construction, LTh at step m starts outputting the whole Rosser list, including r, excluding its negation n (which, by
construction, can’t be on the list). Assume that LTh hasn’t yet output n by step m. (If LTh should have proved n
before the bell rang, then it would have done so because thNum, and thus Th, endorsed n. Since Th(r) holds as well,
Th would then be inconsistent anyway.) So there is an LTh-proof of r which occurs before any LTh-disproof of r:
∃y
[
LPF(y, r) ∧ (∀z≤y) ¬LPF(z, n)
]
,
that is,
Before(r, n).
10 The corresponding dual requirement
(+′4) for all formulas ϕ and all variables x, x′,
PA ` ∀t, t′
[
CTm(t) ∧ CTm(t′) ∧ Th
(
subst2
(pϕq; pxq, px′q; t, t′)) → Th(p∃x, x′ ϕq)]
can do the job too. In both cases, allowing just one substitution is not enough. A more straightforward, but stronger, consequence of (+′1) would be
PA ` ∀f, v, t
[
Fml(f) ∧ Var(v) ∧ CTm(t) ∧ Th(©∀ v f) → Th(subst(f, v, t))],
where Fml(f) and Var(v) are∆01-formulas saying that, respectively, f is a formula and v is a variable, and “©∀ vf” stands for the v-universalization
of f. Again, the dual sentence works as well.
11 This corresponds to the expression “Th f (f)≺ Th f (g)” in [1].
12 The dots above the variables indicate that this is shorthand for
subst2
(
pBefore(n, r)q; pnq, prq; num(n),num(r)
)
,
in which r and n are still free.
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To expose Th as inconsistent, we have to show that Th proves this too. In order to do so, we use Th’s provable
Σ -completeness, (+3). The expression
subst2
(
pBefore(r, n)q; prq, pnq; num(r),num(n)
)
= pBefore(r˙, n˙)q
is (the Go¨del number of) a true Σ 01 -sentence; hence we have
ΣTrue
(pBefore(r˙, n˙)q),
which by (+3) implies
Th
(pBefore(r˙, n˙)q). (2)
However, pBefore(n˙, r˙)q and pBefore(r˙, n˙)q do not yet contradict each other obviously. To bring the inconsistency
out into the open, we finally put to use (+4).
Let’s step out of PA for a moment. For simple arithmetical reasons PA proves
∀f, g[Before(f, g)→ ¬Before(g, f)],
and thus by (DC1) also
Th
(p∀f, g[Before(f, g)→ ¬Before(g, f)]q). (3)
Now jump back inside PA. To obtain Th
(p⊥q) from (1) and (2), we have to apply the generalization in (3) to
our particular ‘sentences’ r and n. Clause (+4), but not (+1)–(+3) by themselves, can give us what we need, viz.,
provability of the corresponding substitution instance:
Th
(pBefore(r˙, n˙)→ ¬Before(n˙, r˙)q).
An application of (+2) yields Th
(p¬Before(n˙, r˙)q), and the rest is easy: by (+1), we have
Th
(pBefore(n˙, r˙) → [¬Before(n˙, r˙)→⊥]q),
and two more applications of (+2) finally deliver Th
(p⊥q).
(The proof using (+′4) runs as follows: From (1) and (2) we get (provability of) their tautological consequence,
Th
(pBefore(n˙, r˙) ∧ Before(r˙, n˙)q),
and (+′4) yields
Th
(p∃f, g[Before(f, g) ∧ Before(g, f)]q).
Analogously to (3), however, we have
Th
(p¬∃f, g[Before(f, g) ∧ Before(g, f)]q),
and thus we get Th
(p⊥q) again.)
The other case, where the bell rings because thNum outputs the negation n of some Rosser sentence r on the list,
is similar but easier. We have Th(©¬ r) and Th(r©↔ rProp(r)). By closure w.r. t. tautological consequence we get
Th
(©¬ rProp(r)), i.e.,
Th
(p¬Before(n˙, r˙)q).
But in fact Before(n, r) is true, because LTh outputs n = ©¬ r in or soon after step m, when r hasn’t yet been output
(or else Th is inconsistent anyway). As a Σ 01 -sentence, Before(n, r) is thus provable:
Th
(pBefore(n˙, r˙)q).
Here, the contradiction in Th’s theorems is obvious and so we don’t need (+4) — nor (+′4). As before, (+1) yields
Th
(pBefore(n˙, r˙) → [¬Before(n˙, r˙)→⊥]q),
and by twice applying (+2) we once more get Th
(p⊥q). 
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